

XVTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION



OTS

STUDY GUIDE

**Strengthening the Multidimensional Security
Architecture: Addressing Asymmetric Threats, Irregular
Migration, and Regional Stability in the Turkic World**

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1. Letter from the Secretary General

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to HASMUN'26 our 15th year of leadership, growth, and unforgettable moments.

For fifteen years, HASMUN has been more than just a conference. It has been a place where ideas are challenged, voices are discovered, and individuals grow into leaders. And now, you are a part of that legacy.

Each of you is stepping into a space where your words matter. Where your perspective can shape discussions, influence outcomes, and inspire others. This is not about being perfect it is about being present, prepared, and willing to engage.

As you go through your study guides, remember that they are not just documents. They are your starting point. Go beyond them. Question more. Think deeper. Speak with purpose.

Because what you build here will not only define your experience at HASMUN — it will stay with you long after the conference ends.

This year marks our 15th edition. And that means something.

It means tradition.

It means excellence.

It means responsibility.

And now, it means you.

I look forward to witnessing your journey, your growth, and the impact you will create.

Welcome home.

Nazrin Sadigova

Secretary General

HASMUN'26 | XV Years of Leadership, XV Years of Excellence

2. Letters from Board Members

Distinguished delegates, we would like to express our excitement at being able to chair the Organization of Turkic States committee.

We welcome you all and hope that you will have a remarkable Model United Nations experience.

The OTS committee is an international organisation that brings together countries that share the same Turkic heritage, language, and cultural bases. Being in Turkiye offers a unique opportunity to better understand the importance of OTS as an international organisation and as a platform that reflects shared history.

This year's agenda, "Strengthening the Multidimensional Security Architecture: Addressing Asymmetric Threats, Irregular Migration, and Regional Stability in the Turkic World," reflects some of the most complex challenges the Turkic world faces.

As members of this committee, you are tasked not only with representing your assigned state, but also with representing the implications of its policies on a diplomatic stage.

We look forward to your participation and to the insightful discussions ahead

Best regards,

OTS Committee Board members.

3. Introduction to the Committee: OTS (Organisation of Turkic States)

The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), formerly known as the Turkic Council, is an intergovernmental organisation established by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye. Over time, the organisation expanded with additional members and observers, including Uzbekistan as a full member.

Unlike many regional organisations that are primarily defined by geographic proximity, the OTS is rooted in a shared cultural, linguistic, and historical identity, forming a unique model of voluntary cooperation among its member states.

Since its establishment, the OTS has gradually evolved beyond a primarily consultative platform into a more active and strategically relevant regional actor. This transformation reflects both the increasing institutionalization of cooperation within the organisation and the growing need for coordinated responses to emerging regional and global challenges.

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the OTS occupies a significant position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, functioning as a bridge between major economic corridors and political spheres of influence. However, this strategic positioning also exposes the region to complex and multidimensional security challenges, ranging from asymmetric threats to migration pressures and shifting regional power dynamics.

In this context, the committee's mandate extends beyond the symbolic realization of the "Turkic Vision 2040." It requires a critical assessment of how the OTS can enhance its institutional capacity, deepen cooperation among member states, and develop effective mechanisms to address the interconnected security issues facing the Turkic world.



Figure 1. Geographical distribution of OTS member states and state observers.

Source: Organisation of Turkic States, turkicstates.org.

3.1. Key terminology

Irregular Migration

Irregular migration refers to the movement of people across borders outside the legal rules regulating entry, transit, or stay. It is often driven by war, economic hardship, political instability, or environmental pressure. In the Turkic world, irregular migration is not only a matter of border control but also raises concerns about human trafficking, migrant vulnerability, and states' ability to manage cross-border movement effectively.

Turkic World

The Turkic world refers to a broader space defined by linguistic, cultural, and historical bonds among Turkic states and communities. In this context, the term is not only cultural. It also points to a political and geopolitical framework where states with shared historical ties seek deeper cooperation and a more coordinated regional approach.

Asymmetric Threats

Asymmetric threats come from actors who do not rely on conventional military power but use less direct, often unpredictable methods to challenge states. These include terrorism, cyberattacks, disinformation, hybrid tactics, and transnational criminal activity. These threats are especially difficult to address because they cross borders, exploit institutional weaknesses, and do not fit traditional security responses.

Multidimensional Security

Multidimensional security is an understanding of security that goes beyond military defense. It includes political stability, economic resilience, social cohesion, border governance, technological capacity, and humanitarian matters. In the Turkic world, this concept is central because the main challenges are closely linked and cannot be solved through a purely military or state-centric approach.

Regional Stability

Regional stability refers to a condition where neighboring states maintain manageable relations, contain tensions, and respond to shared problems without letting them escalate into wider crises. It involves more than the absence of war. It also depends on institutional cooperation, predictable governance, secure borders, and political capacity to address common threats in a coordinated way.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item: Strengthening the Multidimensional Security

Architecture: Addressing Asymmetric Threats, Irregular Migration, and Regional Stability in the Turkic World

The agenda item, **“Strengthening the Multidimensional Security Architecture: Addressing Asymmetric Threats, Irregular Migration, and Regional Stability in the Turkic World”** is based on the fact that security challenges in the Turkic world have become more complex in recent years. Military threats still matter, but they are no longer the only concern. States also face irregular migration, cyber-related risks, disinformation, cross-border crime, and the wider effects of instability in nearby regions.

For the Organization of Turkic States, this matters because the region is politically and geographically sensitive. OTS member states are connected not only by common history and identity but also by common exposure to changing regional pressures. As the

organisation has expanded its cooperation to include migration, political coordination, justice, and law enforcement, security has become harder to treat as a separate, purely national issue.¹

Asymmetric threats are one of the clearest examples of this shift. These threats do not usually take the form of direct conventional conflict between states. Instead, they regularly emerge through less predictable methods such as terrorism, cyberattacks, hybrid tactics, or organized networks that exploit institutional weakness. This makes them harder to contain via fragmented national responses alone.

Another major dimension is irregular migration. In and around the Turkic world, migration is not only a humanitarian issue but also a governance and coordination challenge. The wider Europe and Central Asia region includes countries of origin, transit, and destination. Irregular migration places pressure on border systems, public institutions, and regional cooperation, while increasing risks of trafficking, exploitation, and vulnerability for migrants.²

These issues are closely connected to the wider question of regional stability. Instability in one area can trigger pressure in another. Weak coordination can worsen migration problems, while insecurity and political fragility make non-traditional threats harder to contain. This is why the agenda focuses on multidimensional security rather than a narrow view of defense. The main challenge is not just to identify threats but to consider

how OTS member states can respond in a more coordinated, practical, and sustainable way without losing sight of sovereignty, political differences, and humanitarian responsibilities.

5. Historical background

5.1 Role and Evolution of the Organisation of Turkic States

The Organisation of Turkic States was established in 2009 as an intergovernmental organisation, originally named the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, commonly known as the Turkic Council.³

Its founding members were Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye. In 2019, Uzbekistan joined as a full member, denoting an important step in the institution's expansion.⁴

In its early years, the organisation mainly served as a platform for dialogue and coordination. Its purpose was to encourage cooperation among Turkic states in political, economic, and cultural matters rather than to act as a supranational authority. This is important because the OTS was built on cooperation among sovereign states, and that logic still shapes how it works today.

Over time, the organisation's role widened. As regional developments grew more complicated and cross-border issues became harder to manage through isolated national responses, the OTS

moved beyond symbolic cooperation. Its agenda became more policy-oriented, and its institutional visibility increased.

A major turning point occurred in 2021, when the Turkic Council officially became the Organisation of Turkic States. This change reflected a larger ambition: the organisation no longer presented itself only as a forum for consultation but increasingly as a regional body with a clearer long-term direction⁵

5.2 Development of Security Cooperation across the Turkic World

Security cooperation across the Turkic world did not emerge all at once. It developed gradually alongside the institutional growth of the OTS.

At first, cooperation among member states was shaped more by political dialogue and bilateral relations than by structured regional mechanisms. Over time, it became harder to separate security from other areas of cooperation. Issues like migration, law enforcement, border governance, cyber risks, and regional unrest began to overlap with political and economic concerns.

This is where the OTS began to take on a wider role. As its areas of cooperation expanded, security-related issues became clearer within its institutional framework. Migration cooperation,

justice and law enforcement cooperation, and political coordination all became part of a more organized effort to respond to regional challenges.⁶

Security cooperation within the Turkic world remains limited by the organisation's nature. The OTS is not a military alliance and does not operate through binding shared defense mechanisms. Its strength lies in coordination, consultation, and gradual institutional development. For that reason, cooperation in security matters has progressed cautiously, determined by the political will and priorities of member states.

5.3 Key Turning Points and Regional Developments

Several developments helped push the OTS toward a more strategic role.

The first was its formalized establishment in 2009, which created a regular structure for cooperation among Turkic states. The second was the more extensive institutional expansion that followed, especially after Uzbekistan became a full member in 2019. This gave the organisation greater political weight and a wider regional profile.

Another major milestone came in 2021. At the Istanbul Summit, the organisation adopted its current name, the Organisation of Turkic States, and introduced Turkic World Vision 2040. This was significant because it gave the organisation a more defined long-term framework. Vision 2040 emphasized coordination, resilience, and future-oriented cooperation.⁷

Regional developments also played a major role in influencing the organisation's direction. Instability in bordering regions, changing migration patterns, cyber vulnerabilities, and the rise of non-traditional threats made it harder for member states to treat security as a purely domestic issue. As a result, the need for stronger coordination became more visible.

For this reason, the historical background of this agenda is more than just the growth of an organisation. It is also about the gradual realization that joint identity alone is not enough. As the region became more exposed to cross-border risks, the OTS was pushed to think more seriously about institutional capacity, coordinated responses, and long-term regional stability.



Figure 2. Key milestones in the institutional development of the Organisation of Turkic States.
Source: Compiled by the author based on official OTS documents.

6. Irregular Migration and Border Integrity

6.1 Root Causes of Irregular Migration

The movement of people within the region known as the **Turkic world** comes from many interconnected problems across the wider region. Migrants from Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and other countries living in or near the Turkic region are often forced to leave their homes due to one or more of the following factors.

Socioeconomic Disparities and Economic Hardship: Significant gaps in industrial capacity and economic stability, such as the contrast between Türkiye's influential economy and the higher external dependence of states like Kyrgyzstan, create a natural pull toward more resilient markets. Many individuals migrate to escape persistent poverty, high unemployment, or the lack of professional opportunities in their home countries.

Political Instability and Regional Conflict: War and civil unrest in regions adjacent to the Turkic world, particularly in the Middle East and parts of Central Asia, remain primary drivers of forced displacement. Instability in one area frequently triggers migration pressure in another, as individuals seek safety from persecution or systemic governance failures.

The Bridge and Transit Phenomenon: Due to its strategic positioning at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, the OTS region acts as a critical transit corridor. Migrants often enter the Turkic world not as a final destination, but as a gateway to the European Union, exploiting the region's connectivity and transport routes.

Environmental Pressures and Climate Change: Environmental degradation and instability are increasingly recognized as “push” factors that force communities to move when their traditional livelihoods, such as agriculture, are no longer sustainable.

Transnational Criminal Exploitation: The presence of organized networks that facilitate human smuggling and trafficking exploits existing institutional weaknesses and the vulnerability of those already on the move. These networks often turn regular migration aspirations into irregular and dangerous journeys.

Institutional and Administrative Limitations: Discrepancies in state capacity to manage cross-border movement effectively, combined with uneven border governance, create “security gaps” that irregular migration flows can bypass. This is compounded by the fact that OTS members do not always share identical migration pressures or priorities.

6.2 Migration Routes and Regional Dynamics

The **Turkic world occupies an important position within wider regional migration dynamics**, functioning in different contexts as a space of origin, transit, and destination. There are many transit points, places of origin, and destination points within the Turkic world, creating a highly complex migration system that remains in constant flux due to changes in border policies, regional conflict, and the development of new routes.

The Mediterranean and Aegean Route: Türkiye serves as a primary hub for migrants from the Middle East and Asia attempting to reach the European Union. This route is heavily influenced by Türkiye’s strategic position as a bridge between political spheres of influence.

The Central Asian Corridor: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan act as major transit and destination points for labor migration within the region. This corridor is often utilized by migrants from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan moving toward larger economic centers.

The “Middle Corridor” Impact: As the OTS focuses on transport and trade connectivity, these emerging logistics routes may also be utilized by irregular migration networks moving across Eurasia.

Shifting Patterns due to External Actors: The influence of China’s infrastructure projects and the EU’s strategic partnerships in Central Asia may also shape the physical pathways that migration flows follow.

Intra-Regional Labor Flows: There is a significant internal movement of people between OTS member states, driven by the uneven economic base where some states rely on remittances while others demand industrial labor.

Transit Vulnerability Zones: Specific border regions between member states, particularly those with limited institutional capacity, become “bottlenecks” where migrants are at high risk of exploitation by smuggling networks.

Illustrative Regional Instances

Türkiye: Irregular Migration Beyond Borders

An illustrative case is Türkiye, where irregular migration reflects the nation's position as both a transit country and, at times, a destination. Irregular migration does not end at the border. The challenge continues to affect registration processes, detention capacity, law enforcement coordination, and the administrative burden on state institutions. The Turkish example highlights a key point of this guide: irregular migration is not simply a border issue but also an institutional challenge.

In the Turkic world, Türkiye is significant because of its position between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Migration pressure toward or through Türkiye rarely develops in isolation. Regional conflict, economic problems, insecurity, and cross-border smuggling networks shape it. This makes Türkiye a key case for the OTS agenda, not because it reflects all member states' experiences equally, but because it shows how irregular migration can quickly become more complex than border management alone. It can challenge administrative systems, burden law enforcement, and expose limits in institutional coordination when migration trends persist or become politically contentious.

The Turkish case also shows why the issue cannot be reduced to security alone. Countries may improve border enforcement and restrict unauthorized crossings, but effective migration oversight requires legal procedures, agency coordination, the ability to address humanitarian needs, and administrative consistency. Türkiye is important to the OTS not just for its location

but because it represents the core conflict of this agenda: protecting border integrity while managing the legal, social, and institutional effects of irregular migration.

Eastern Mediterranean: The Instability of Connected Routes

A second valuable illustration is the broader Eastern Mediterranean. It demonstrates that irregular migration within and near the Turkic world ought to be viewed as a dynamic regional issue rather than a static route concern. Migration routes do not stay constant over time. When a route becomes more difficult to use due to tighter enforcement, political agreements, monitoring, or increased risks, the pressure moves to an adjacent corridor. Even when activity appears to reduce in one area, the wider system may still remain under pressure.

This is especially important for the OTS as the Turkic world is adjacent to various interconnected movement areas. Pressures influencing Türkiye and nearby transit areas are determined not just by internal border policy but also by changes in neighboring regions. Smuggling networks adapt, routes shift, and border policies affect movement trends. Unrest in one area can shift stress to another. The Eastern Mediterranean case illustrates that irregular migration is dynamic and flexible, challenging efforts to manage it with limited or rigid border measures.

This is significant for OTS member states, as transport, trade, and migration routes frequently intersect. An area that becomes more strategically important because of connectivity could also become more vulnerable to migrant smuggling, cross-border crime, and abrupt changes in migration flows. Route dynamics encompass not only the locations of people's movements but also how states respond when these movements become less predictable and more closely linked to broader regional trends.

The Importance of Such Cases for the OTS Agenda

Overall, these cases offer concrete support for the argument in this section. The Turkish case shows how irregular migration can be a complex problem for the state, involving territorial control, administrative capacity, enforcement ability, the legal framework, and effective governance. Meanwhile, the Eastern Mediterranean case suggests the environment around the Turkic world consists of constantly changing, interconnected corridors rather than a stable pathway.

This difference is important for the purpose of this discussion, because the agenda set forth by the Organisation of Turkic States is not so much about determining whether irregular migration exists at all. The more important consideration in this case is how member states perceive the phenomenon. If viewed solely as a domestic issue of border control, measures taken would likely remain limited and reactive. However, if viewed as a regional and national problem related to the dynamics of smuggling corridors, the flexibility of routes, institutional limitations, together with the broader instability affecting connected regions, then the need for coordination, information-sharing, and more flexible policy responses becomes much clearer.

6.3 Implications for Border Security and State Sovereignty

The management of irregular migration represents one of the most significant challenges to the institutional development of the Organisation of Turkic States, as it directly affects the traditional understanding of state sovereignty. While the OTS is rooted in a shared cultural and historical identity, the practical reality of border integrity remains a strictly national prerogative, creating a

tension between the need for regional coordination and the desire to maintain national room for maneuver. Irregular migration places direct and heavy pressure on the border systems and public institutions of member states, testing their administrative capacity and their ability to manage cross-border movement effectively.

This pressure often reveals existing security gaps and institutional limitations, particularly in states with lower economic resilience or limited institutional capacity, such as Kyrgyzstan. Because member states are not exposed to the same migration pressures or risks, their views on border security can differ significantly. For instance, a threat that one member sees as an urgent priority for border tightening may be treated more cautiously by another state that prioritizes trade connectivity or different diplomatic interests.

Furthermore, the rise of irregular migration is closely linked to broader security concerns, including human trafficking and the exploitation of migrants by organized networks. This forces OTS member states to navigate a delicate balance between securitizing their borders to prevent asymmetric threats and fulfilling their humanitarian responsibilities to vulnerable populations.

The challenge for the organisation is to move toward a more coordinated approach to border governance as envisioned in “Turkic World Vision 2040” without creating a supranational authority that undermines the sovereign decision-making of its members. Ultimately, how the OTS addresses border integrity will determine whether it can evolve into a platform for practical regional resilience or remain a primarily consultative forum.

7. Asymmetric Warfare and Countering Non-Traditional Security Threats

The nature of conflict and security in the Turkic world has undergone a fundamental shift as conventional military threats are increasingly overshadowed by asymmetric tactics that exploit institutional vulnerabilities rather than seeking direct confrontation. Asymmetric threats come from actors who do not rely on traditional military power but instead use unpredictable methods like terrorism, cyberattacks, disinformation, and hybrid tactics to challenge the stability of sovereign states. These threats are particularly difficult to address because they frequently cross national borders, exploit existing security gaps, and do not fit within the scope of traditional defense responses. For the Organisation of Turkic States, this transition is critical because member states are connected by a common exposure to these changing regional pressures, making it impossible to treat security as a purely domestic issue.

The digital landscape has become a primary battlefield for these non-traditional threats, with cyber-related risks and organized disinformation campaigns targeting the political and social cohesion of the region. Because OTS member states possess uneven technological capacities and institutional strengths, asymmetric actors can exploit specific vulnerabilities to disrupt regional stability. To combat this, recent institutional efforts such as the Budapest Declaration of 2025 have prioritized resilience and stronger cooperation against cybercrime, terrorism financing, and organized crime, signaling a move toward a more proactive and policy-oriented regional security framework. This coordinated approach is essential because fragmented national responses are often insufficient to contain networks that operate across borders and exploit the legal and administrative differences between states.

Furthermore, the OTS has increasingly focused on counter-terrorism and the neutralization of transnational criminal networks as pillars of its “Turkic World Vision 2040.” The organisation has established structured platforms for Justice and Law Enforcement Cooperation, which facilitate more regular channels for information-sharing and technical dialogue among member states. While these mechanisms do not constitute a formal military alliance or a shared defense structure, they reflect a growing realization that joint identity must be supported by practical, coordinated responses to cross-border risks. Ultimately, the effectiveness of the OTS in countering asymmetric warfare depends on its ability to translate political declarations into consistent implementation, ensuring that regional stability is maintained through collective resilience rather than isolated crisis management.

The strategic importance of the Turkic world as a global transport hub further complicates the fight against asymmetric threats, as the same infrastructure intended to boost economic connectivity can be exploited by illicit actors. Transport cooperation and trade connectivity are no longer just economic goals; they are deeply tied to regional security. As the OTS region bridges major economic corridors between Europe and Asia, it becomes a target for transnational criminal networks involved in smuggling and trafficking, requiring states to coordinate their law-enforcement efforts to protect these supply chains. The 2024 Bishkek Declaration specifically highlighted the need for this coordination to address developments that threaten regional **stability**, acknowledging that instability in one area can quickly spill over through these interconnected routes.

8. Current Status

8.1 Political and Economic Landscape of OTS Member States

As of 2026, the Organisation of Turkic States brings together members sharing a broad political outlook but no single political or economic model.⁸

Türkiye remains the largest and most influential economy in the organisation. Its position is shaped by industrial capacity, trade connectivity, defense production, and an active diplomatic profile. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan stand out as energy-exporting states with major transport value. Uzbekistan has become more prominent through economic reforms and a more active regional role. Kyrgyzstan remains the most economically fragile member with limited institutional capacity and higher external dependence.⁹

This uneven structure is one of the OTS's defining features. Its members do not operate from the same economic base. Some rely heavily on hydrocarbons, others try to diversify through reform, and some remain vulnerable to remittances and external shocks. This gives the OTS strategic breadth but makes coordination harder. A challenge manageable for one member may place greater pressure on another, especially in border governance, migration management, or internal resilience.

Politically, the OTS is better described as pragmatic than deeply integrated. Member states work together because coordination, connectivity, and regional visibility serve their interests. They remain careful to preserve national room for maneuver. In practice, the organisation has a shared sense of direction but not full alignment in institutional capacity, domestic priorities, or foreign policy behavior.

8.2 Influence of External Actors

The current position of the OTS must also be understood in relation to external actors. China has strengthened its role in Central Asia through trade, infrastructure, logistics, and long-term state-to-state coordination. In recent years, this role has become more visible through the China–Central Asia framework and a stronger emphasis on industrial investment, transport routes, and connectivity. For OTS members, China is not simply an economic partner. It **also** shapes regional corridors, supply chains, and key calculations.¹⁰

The European Union has also become more active. The first EU–Central Asia Summit in 2025 raised relations to a strategic partnership and gave fresh momentum to cooperation in transport, energy, digital connectivity, and critical raw materials. This matters for the OTS because several member states are now positioned between European demand for alternative routes and Central Asia’s search for diversified partnerships. Connectivity has become more than an economic issue; it is now tied directly to geopolitics.¹¹

Russia is still a major factor. Its influence is no longer viewed the same way as before 2022, but it still matters through energy corridors, security legacies, labor migration links, and the wider Eurasian environment. The OTS does not operate in isolation. Its members **navigate** a regional

order in which China, the European Union, and Russia each shape choices based on different concerns and priorities.¹²

8.3 Existing Security Gaps and Institutional Limitations

Despite growing visibility, the OTS still faces clear institutional limits in security. Cooperation has expanded in migration, justice, law enforcement, and political coordination, yet the organisation does not function as a shared defense structure. It lacks binding commitments, **operational mechanisms**, or standing executive structures that would enable it to respond to regional threats as a formal security alliance would.¹³

This creates a gap between goal and capacity. The language of cooperation has broadened, and the policy agenda is more developed than in earlier years. Even so, implementation depends heavily on the political will of member states. Information-sharing, coordinated responses, and long-term planning remain uneven. In practice, the OTS is often better at identifying common challenges than addressing them through unified action.

Another limitation is that member states are not exposed to the same risks. They do not face identical migration pressures, border vulnerabilities, or levels of dependence on external transport and security environments. This makes it harder to build unified responses. A threat one member sees as urgent may be treated more cautiously or through a different institutional lens by another.

For this reason, the current status of the OTS is best understood as partial consolidation. The organisation is more visible, policy-oriented, and strategically aware than in earlier years. At the same time, its security role remains constrained by uneven state capacity, limited institutionalization, and the continued importance of national sovereignty in decision-making.

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9. Previous Actions and Institutional Efforts

9.1 Regional Initiatives and Agreements within OTS

Within the OTS, previous actions on security issues have not taken the form of a single defense treaty or a centralized enforcement mechanism. Instead, they developed through summit declarations, sectoral cooperation platforms, and expanding institutional channels. This reflects the organisation's broader nature, which favors coordination and consultation over binding enforcement.

An important step was the adoption of Turkic World Vision 2040, which gave OTS cooperation a longer-term, more strategic direction. Rather than limiting cooperation to symbolic unity or broad diplomatic language, the document emphasized coordination, resilience, and the need for member states to strengthen their capacity to respond to today's challenges, both individually and collectively.¹⁴

More recent OTS declarations have addressed themes directly linked to this agenda. The Bishkek Declaration of 2024 highlighted stronger coordination on regional security, irregular migration,

humanitarian matters, and developments related to Afghanistan. The Budapest Declaration of 2025 went further by emphasizing resilience and stronger cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, terrorist financing, and cybercrime. Together, these initiatives show that the OTS has begun to approach multidimensional security as a practical field of coordination rather than a rhetorical one.¹⁵

9.2 International Frameworks and Cooperation Mechanisms

The OTS has also placed its regional efforts within a wider international framework. One official area of cooperation is engagement with **international organisations**, which is important because many challenges facing the Turkic world—such as trafficking, smuggling, irregular migration, cybercrime, and broader instability—cannot be addressed through regional dialogue alone.

This broader approach is also seen in the organisation's work on migration and justice. OTS cooperation areas now formally include Migration Cooperation and Justice and Law Enforcement Cooperation, and these mechanisms have become more structured in recent years. While they do not create a common legal or security order, they establish more regular channels for information-sharing, dialogue, and technical cooperation among member states.¹⁶

At the diplomatic level, the OTS continues to reaffirm coordination through ministerial meetings and joint statements. This helps connect policy areas, including migration, law enforcement, political dialogue, and regional security, into a more coherent institutional direction.

9.3 Evaluation of Effectiveness and Existing Limitations

These efforts are meaningful but their effectiveness remains limited. On one hand, the OTS addresses a wider set of issues than in earlier years. Security-related concerns now appear more directly in official cooperation areas, declarations, and ministerial platforms. This suggests a real shift toward a wider, more policy-oriented **understanding** of regional cooperation.

On the other hand, the organisation still works through gradual coordination rather than binding execution. Its mechanisms are useful for agenda-setting, political signaling, and institutional dialogue but depend on member states to implement outcomes nationally. In practice, this means the OTS is better at identifying shared concerns and building channels for cooperation than at delivering fully unified responses.¹⁷

A further limitation is that the organisation deals with deeply cross-border issues while member states differ in institutional capacity, political priorities, and pressing needs. For that reason, previous efforts should be seen as groundwork rather than a complete solution. The OTS has created an institutional basis for cooperation, especially in political dialogue, migration, and justice, but this basis still needs to be translated into stronger and more consistent implementation.

10. Possible Solutions

10.1 Strengthening Institutional Coordination within OTS

A more effective response to multidimensional security challenges entails stronger institutional coordination within the OTS. The organisation has platforms for exchange and cooperation, but

these need to function more regularly and in a connected way. One practical step is to strengthen coordination between existing ministerial, law enforcement, migration, and political consultation mechanisms so security-related issues are not treated in isolation.

This would not require the OTS to become a supranational authority or military alliance. Instead, it means building consistent channels for member states to exchange information, identify common priorities, and respond to concurrent risks more timely. In the long term, stronger institutional coordination would reduce fragmentation and help the organisation move from political statements to pragmatic implementation.¹⁸

10.2 Establishing Joint Security and Intelligence Mechanisms

A second priority is creating more structured security and intelligence cooperation arrangements among member states. Many threats discussed here—terrorism, cybercrime, organized crime, trafficking, and hybrid tactics—are cross-border. They are difficult to contain when states act separately and share information only in limited or informal ways.

For this reason, the OTS could develop more consistent mechanisms for threat assessment, intelligence exchange, and technical coordination across common areas. This does not mean a centralized intelligence structure. A more realistic approach is to establish coordinated working groups, periodic joint assessments, and safe communication channels among relevant institutions. The aim is to improve early warning capacity and practical cooperation without creating arrangements that member states would view as too intrusive.¹⁹

10.3 Comprehensive Migration Management Strategies

Irregular migration should be handled through a wider, more balanced framework. A purely security-based approach is unlikely to suffice, especially since migration is affected by conflict, economic pressure, governance failures, and human vulnerability. For this reason, the OTS should encourage a comprehensive migration strategy combining border management with humanitarian considerations and institutional cooperation.

Such an approach could include closer coordination on migrant smuggling and trafficking, more regular exchanges of migration-related data, stronger border governance capacity, and greater cooperation between migration authorities and law-enforcement bodies. At the same time, member states should remain mindful that irregular migration is not only a matter of control but also of protection, legality, and administrative capacity. A more balanced migration framework would therefore help the OTS address both security concerns and human responsibilities without treating the two as opposites.²⁰

10.4 Enhancing Regional Stability through Economic and Political Cooperation

Sustained stability cannot be built solely through security measures. To respond effectively to regional insecurity, the OTS must also strengthen the political and economic conditions that enable resilience. In practice, transport cooperation, trade connectivity, institutional development, and political dialogue should be part of the security picture rather than separate issues.

A realistic way forward is to deepen cooperation in areas that reduce structural vulnerability over time. Better connectivity, more resilient institutions, stronger policy dialogue, and wider economic coordination contribute to regional stability by reducing dependence on crisis-driven responses. The OTS does not need to choose between security and development. One of its greatest advantages is treating the two as mutually reinforcing.

Concluding Note on Implementation

Taken together, these solutions indicate that the future role of the OTS should not be understood in narrow military terms. Its strength lies in its ability to build coordination across multiple fields simultaneously, including politics, migration, law enforcement, connectivity, and regional diplomacy. The most effective way forward is therefore not sudden institutional transformation but gradual, practical consolidation. If member states are willing to strengthen cooperation consistently, the OTS can become better able to address multidimensional security challenges without abandoning the principle of national sovereignty, which still shapes the organisation.

11. Conclusion

The debate over multidimensional security within the Turkic world ultimately raises a wider institutional question: whether the Organization of Turkic States can evolve from a framework of political coordination into a more effective platform for practical regional resilience. The issues discussed throughout this guide, such as asymmetric threats, irregular migration, and regional stability, are not separate challenges. They reinforce one another and expose the limits of fragmented responses.

At the same time, the OTS operates under clear organisational constraints. It is not a shared defense alliance, and its member states do not share identical capacities, priorities, or external alignments. This makes fully unified action difficult. Yet it would be inaccurate to reduce the organisation to a symbolic forum. In recent years, the OTS has expanded its institutional agenda, widened its areas of cooperation, and shown a clearer willingness to treat migration, justice, law enforcement, and broader coordination as part of a shared regional framework.²¹

For this reason, the real significance of this agenda does not lie in whether the OTS can immediately eliminate threats facing the region. Rather, it lies in whether member states can use the organisation to build stronger coordination habits, more regular cooperation channels, and more realistic collective responses. In that sense, the future of security cooperation in the Turkic world depends less on sudden transformation and more on gradual institutional consolidation.

Delegates should therefore address this topic with both ambition and realism. Effective solutions must take into account national sovereignty, uneven institutional capacity, and political

differences among member states. At the same time, they should recognize that long-term regional stability will be harder to preserve if cross-border threats persist and are treated mainly through isolated national approaches.

In conclusion, the OTS stands at an important stage in its development. It has moved beyond being only a platform of common identity and diplomatic symbolism. The next challenge is to translate this political and institutional potential into more consistent, coordinated, and durable responses to the multidimensional security issues forming the Turkic world today.²²

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12. Questions to be Addressed

1. To what extent can the Organization of Turkic States develop a more coordinated security framework without undermining the sovereignty of its member states?
2. How can OTS member states respond more effectively to asymmetric threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, disinformation, and transnational criminal activity?
3. What practical mechanisms can be established to improve intelligence-sharing, early warning, and institutional coordination among OTS member states?
4. How should the OTS address irregular migration in a way that balances border security with humanitarian responsibilities?
5. What role can stronger migration governance and law-enforcement cooperation play in reducing trafficking, smuggling, and migrant vulnerability across the region?
6. How do differences in political priorities, economic capacity, and institutional development affect the ability of OTS member states to build a unified response to shared security challenges?
7. In what ways do external actors such as China, the European Union, and Russia influence the strategic environment in which the OTS operates?
8. How can the OTS strengthen regional stability without becoming dependent on reactive, short-term crisis responses?
9. What institutional limitations currently prevent the OTS from acting more effectively in the field of multidimensional security?

10. To what extent can economic cooperation, transport connectivity, and political dialogue help sustain long-term security and resilience in the Turkic world?
11. Should the OTS gradually deepen its role in security coordination, or should it prioritize maintaining a more limited framework based primarily on consultation?
12. What realistic and sustainable policy proposals can member states adopt to make OTS cooperation more practical, consistent, and effective in the face of current regional challenges?

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13. Further Readings and References

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